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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LENORE M. GILL, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
RULAND J. GILL, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Case No. 19142 
This is an appeal by Plaintiff from a Decree of Divorce 
which distributed property and assets in a manner contrary to 
Plaintiff's wishes. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This matter was tried to the Court, Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decree were perfected and filed and 
disposed of the marital assets acquired by the parties during 
marriage. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a modification of the property distribution 
as ordered by the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff filed an action for divorce and prayed for 
equitable property distribution of marital assets acquired during 
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the marriage between herself and defendant. A stipulated Restrainic. 
Order was entered on the records of the court on the 29th of 
October, 1979, which contained a clause restraining Defendant from 
encumbering or disposing of, in any manner whatsoever, any assets ul 
properties of the Utah corporations Gill Tire Market, Inc. or 
Fleetway, Inc. without the express prior knowledge and approval of 
Plaintiff or without obtaining appropriate court order (R. 21). 
At the time of the order, the Defendant was operating Gill's 
Tire Market and Fleetway, Inc. and made his living as the operator 
of those corporations. Plaintiff did not participate in the 
management of either corporation, and after the Restraining Order 
was entered, Defendant continued to operate the businesses and used 
the assets of Fleetway, Inc. when it became defunct to operate a 
retail tire outlet in the name of Tire City. None of the businesses 
succeeded and, as a consequence, the marital estate being used by 
Defendant decreased in value. 
At the Plaintiff's request, the divorce action was bifurcate: 
and a decree obtained by Plaintiff on the 22nd day of January, 1980 
which reserved the issues regarding distribution of parties' marital 
assets for further proceeding (R. 41). At the time of the decree, 
Defendant was operating the business subsequently known as Fleetway, 
Inc. and Gill's Tire Market. 
Extended hearings into the property rights of the parties 
commenced on the 22nd of December and were completed on the 28th 
of December. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were then 
prepared and, it is Defendant's belief, coverPd all issues raised 
at the time of trial. 
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Extended hearings into the property rights of the parties 
commenced on the 22nd of December and were completed on the 28th 
of December. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were then 
prepared and, it is Defendant's belief, covered all issues raised 
at the time of trial. 
The Plaintiff explored, through her own witnesses and 
through cross-examination, the many claims which she had that 
the Defendant had wrongfully dissipated assets of the marital 
estate and had violated the Restraining Order issued. 
The court found that Defendant had operated the businesses 
of Gill's Tire Market, Fleetway, Inc., and Tire City, that the 
businesses had not prospered, and that there had been no increase 
in assets of the parties used by Defendant to operate the 
businesses or to maintain himself (Finding #11, R. 160). 
The court specifically found R. 158) that the 
Defendant had not intentionally secreted or hid assets belonging 
to the marital estate or attempted to deprive Plaintiff of her 
interest in those assets. 
Plaintiff, through much of the hearing as shown by the 
transcript of testimony, tried to prove the contrary to Finding 
#3. 
There was no finding that the Defendant had violated the 
Restraining Order which was in place during the period from 
October, 1979 to December, 1982. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRIBUTION ORDERED BY THE COURT IS 
A PROPER EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT FIND THAT DEFENDANT 
VIOLATED THE RESTRAINING ORDER. 
POINT III 
AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES WERE PROPER 
EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION. 
POINT I 
THE DISTRIBUTION ORDERED BY THE COURT IS 
A PROPER EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION. 
The marital estate of parties to this action consisted of 
interest of the parties in going businesses which the Defendant 
continued to operate after the divorce complaint was filed, a home 
in which the Plaintiff resided, and numerous other miscellaneous 
items of personal property. Many hours of testimony were taken by 
the court and no restriction placed on any party to present every 
item of evidence available on the issues. 
The record is clear that after January, 1980, when Plaintif: 
obtained her divorce, constant efforts were made to monitor and 
oversee the activities of the Defendant in the operations of the 
businesses he was engaged in. 
The court decree divided the personal property by 
to the Plaintiff and Defendant items that their interests seemed Cc 
indicate would be proper for them in building a new life. It order, 
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that the home of the parties be sold, the obligations relating 
to it paid and the balance of the proceeds divided one half to 
each of the parties. There was an order that accounts receivable 
from the Fleetway tire business be divided equally. Defendant 
was ordered to pay the business debts and the marital debts 
incurred by the parties prior to separation that any proceeds 
out of the bankruptcy be divided equally and that the Defendant 
pay all the business debts incurred in his business operation of 
Tire City. Defendant was ordered to pay any income tax obligations 
owing for the years 1977, 1978 and 1979 while parties lived together. 
It is apparent Defendant believes that the court attempted 
to equitably divide the property acquired by the parties during 
their marriage and to make a 50-50 distribution. Considering the 
complexity of the business operations and the items of personal and 
real property, as well as extensive amount of obligations that were 
owing, Defendant submits that the court did a masterful and expert 
job in fashioning an equitable decree. The decree certainly 
cannot be shown to involve any abuse of discretion. 
This court for many years has steadfastly adhered to the 
rule that the trial court is permitted considerable discretion in 
adjusting the financial and property interest of the parties and 
its 3Ctions are entitled to presumption of validity. Savage v. 
Sa•1age, 658 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983). 
In another recent decision by this court, the rule was 
Pven more strongly stated and this court held in Gibbon v. Gibbon, 
656 P.2d 407 as follows: 
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"In order to reverse the trial court's distribution of 
property in a divorce action, we must find that it "works 
such a manifest injustice or inequity, as to indicate a 
clear abuse of discretion " Turner v. Turner, Utah. 
P.2d 6 (1982). In light of the widely divergent theories 
and conflicting testimony at trial, we cannot say that 
it was an abuse of discretion for the court to resolve 
the differences between the parties as it did." 
See also, Woodard v. Woodard 656 P.2d 431. 
Defendant submits that the division of the property rights 
of the parties demonstrates a careful exercise of discretion on the 
part of the trial court. It fashioned a decree equitable and fair. 
Allocating to each party the property that would promote the likely· 
hood that the individual could resume his or her life and adjust to 
the status created by the divorce decree. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT FIND THAT DEFENDANT 
VIOLATED THE RESTRAINING ORDER. 
The Restraining Order stipulated to by parties was entered 
on the 29th of October, 1979. Defendant obtained the dicorce decree 
dissolving the marital relation on the 22nd day of January, 1980. 
During that period of time, the Fleetway business was being dissolvec 
the Gill Tire Market business was not active and was heading for 
bankruptcy. There is no question but what all parties understood 
the circumstances and that Defendant was attempting to salvage what 
he could from the businesses that were rapidly deteriorating into 
insolvency. 
It apparently is the position of Plaintiff that the 
Restraining Order was intended to prevent Defendant from continuing 
the operation of the businesses that he was engaged in or attemptin• 
to salvage and re-establish those businesses so that he could earn 
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money from his occupation. 
The discovery proceedings and deposition of Defendant 
reveals knowledge of all parties that Defendant was continuing 
his business activities. Defendant submits that neither party 
interpreted the Restraining Order as meaning that the Defendant 
could not continue to operate to the best of his ability the 
businesses that he was engaged in at the time of the separation 
and the filing of the complaint. 
Marital assets were sold or divided equally. Procedes 
from horse sales were distributed by Defendant to Plaintiff 
demonstrating his interpretation of the Restraining Order. 
Plaintiff did not seek any contempt citations prior to the trial 
for Defendant's continued efforts to operate his businesses. It 
would appear that the Plaintiff also understood that the Restraining 
Order was not intended to prevent Defendant attempting to earn 
his living through Gill's Tire Market, Fleetway Tire or even in the 
establishment of Tire City. 
Trial court did not find that the Defendant violated the 
Restraining Order. 
The contention by Plaintiff that Defendant had intentionally 
secreted or hid assets belonging to the marital estate or attempted 
to deprive Plaintiff of her interest in those assets was a main 
issue at the trial. Most of the discovery proceedings were aimed 
at that particular contention. Plaintiff failed in her effort to 
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prove this allegation on which she had the burden of proof. The 
court found that Defendant did not intentionally secret or hide 
assets belonging to the marital estate or attempt to deprive 
Plaintiff of her interest in those assets. (R 157) 
It is understandable that the Plaintiff was disappointed 
in Defendant's efforts to establish his retail tire business after 
the failure of Gill's Tire Market and Fleetway, Inc. It is also 
obvious that the Defendant was disappointed in these efforts and 
that his disappointment was probably greater than Plaintiff's. But 
that is a far cry from the proposition argued before this court in 
the brief of the Plaintiff that the business failures were the 
result of Defendant's intentional efforts. It is respectfully 
submitted, none of the parties intended the order would stop the 
operation by Defendant of any of the businesses or retail tire 
activities in which he was engaged. 
POINT III 
AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES WERE PROPER 
EXERCISE OF JL'DICIAL DISCRETION. 
The court awarded Plaintiff attorney's fees of the 
approximate amount that were incurred by Plaintiff prior to the 
divorce on the 22nd of January, 1980 and did not award attorney's 
fees for the efforts following the divorce to show intentional 
dissipation of marital assets. 
The barrage of discovery activity would seem to indicate 
a paranoia on the part of Plaintiff and her counsel. The final 
resolution of the matter demonstrates that the suspicions and 
fears of the Plaintiff which resulted in the repeated discovery 
maneuvers, were unfounded. 
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It is Defendant's position in this matter that the present 
appeal is an extension of the attitude shown in the trial and the 
solidly held belief by Plaintiff that Defendant's business reverses 
were not the result of his inability to establish a tire business 
such as he had conducted during the years of marriage and out of 
which he had supported himself and his family, but that his failures 
were due in some way to an intentional effort on his part to dissipate 
the marital assets and deprive Plaintitf of her share thereof. 
A clear statement of this court's rulings on attorney's 
fees is found in Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105. The language 
of the court is as follows: 
"The award of attorney's fees is in the sound discretion 
of the trial court and will not be overturned in the 
absence of a showing of a clear abuse of that discretion. 
See Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, Utah, 578 P.Ld 520 (1978); 
Turtle Management v. Haggis Management, Utah 645 P.2d 
667 (1982). We find no clear abuse of discretion and 
affirm the award of attorney's fees." 
It is true that the court did not award the Plaintiff the 
attorney's fees that the testimony of her attorney might have been 
earned. The court had before it a similar situation in Savage v. 
Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, and the language of the decision there seems 
especially appropriate here. It is as follows: 
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"Finally, on the question of attorney's fees, we hold 
that there was ample evidence to support the trial 
court's award and that there has been no showing of 
manifest injustice therein The fee awarded was 
considerably less than that established by testimony 
at trial, and the evidence on the parties' relative 
ability to pay the amounts in question support the 
award. Absent an abuse of discretion, we will not 
second-guess the trial court on this issue where there 
is sufficient evidence on the reasonableness of the 
fee, the need of the plaintiff and the relative 
superiority of the defendant's ability to pay." 
In Beckstrom v. Beckstrom 578 P.2d 520, the court had before 
it a refusal by the trial to give the attorney's fees requested and 
pertinent to the present question, Defendant believes is the court's 
language: 
"The Laubs further complain of being short-changed by 
the trial court awarding it attorney's fees of only $500 
as the "reasonable" fee provided for enforcement of the 
contract. Their attorney testified that on the basis of 
the work involved the reasonable amount to award as his 
attorney's fee would be $800. Even though that evidence 
is undisputed,the trial judge was not necessarily 
compelled to accept such self-interested testimony whole 
cloth and make such an award;7 and in the absence of 
patent error or clear abuse of discretion, §his court 
will not disturb his findings and judgment. 
7. Arnold Machinery Company, Inc. Vo Intrusion Prepakt Inc 
11 Utah 2d 246, 357 Po2d 4960 
8. 20 Am.Jur.2d Costs, Sec. 78. 
The great majority of the hours claimed by Plaintiff were 
spent in trying to show intentional misuse of the marital assetso t 
this Plaintiff failedo For this time Defendant submits he should no· 
be required to payo This time was after the marital status had 
disolved and no one benefited from the hours thus spent 
CONCLUSION 
The record shows clearly that there was no abuse of discre'' 
by the trial court in either the property settlement or attorney's 
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fee awards. No findings of a violation or the Restraining Order 
by Defendant was made. The judgment of the trial court should 
be affirmed. , 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED day of October, 1983. 
DWIGHT L. KING & A SOCIATES, P.C. 
